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This paper analyzes exchange rate policies in Chile since the 1960s.  A
brief overview of main policies is presented.  Particular attention is paid to
the two episodes of fixed-exchange rate as well as the reasons why policy
makers may have arrived to those decisions. The paper also examines the
long tradition of Chile on the use of crawling peg to preserve
competitiveness and as a quick exit during times of crisis.  More
specifically, this paper attempts to uncover political economy factors that
may have influenced decisions on exchange rate policy.  Empirical evidence
on the economic environment during different episodes of exchange rate
management as well as the political economy factors that may have
underlay the options is presented.1. Introduction
Since 1960 Chile has experienced not only several exchange rate regimes, but also several
approaches to economic policy.  From an import substitution strategy in the sixties, to full-
fledged populism in the early seventies, Chile has adopted, since mid seventies, an open free
market economy with , conservative macroeconomic management.  During the whole period
the implementation of macroeconomic policies has changed according to the external
environment as well as internal developments.  The importance of inflation, macroeconomic
stability, outward orientation, competitiveness, structural reforms, and other objectives have
played different roles in the choice of the exchange rate regime and stabilization policies.  At
the same time, economic policy has not been isolated from pressures from interest groups
and political economy considerations.  Indeed, many decisions are made taking into account
pressures as well as the need to build support for policies, and hence some compensation
mechanism arise.
Economic performance has also been extremely varied during this period.  The
economy has gone from moderate growth in the sixties, to extreme inflation, stabilization
and recovery from recession in the seventies, and finally to a big recession-recovery cycle,
followed by high growth since the eighties.
The varied experiences and performance make Chile an interesting case in exchange rate
policy during the last 30 to 40 years.  It is interesting to note that at least during the latest
fifteen years exchange rate policy has been one of the main areas of public attention and
discussion regarding economic policy.  As a consequence of the crisis of 1982 and the good
record since the mid eighties high priority has been given to retaining competitiveness, not
only at a government level but also within the private sector.
The next section describes the evolution of exchange rate policies in Chile.  Section 3
discusses the political economy of exchange rates, analyzing the role of exchange rate policy
in the context of other objectives and as part of a whole package of macroeconomic policy.
Section 4 describes the data and performs some preliminary analysis on measures of
misalignment and the relationship between exchange rate regime, trade policy, and other
characteristics of the economy.  In section 5 1 present multinomial logit analyses to examine
the determinants of the exchange rate choice.  Finally, section 6 is a conclusion.
2. Evolution of Exchange Rates and Policies
The real exchange rate has displayed large fluctuations since the 1960s (Figure 1).  Changes
in
fundamentals, such as terms of trade, productivity, degree of openness, etc., explain this
evolution.  But also, changes in nominal exchange rate policies have had persistent effects on
the behavior of the real exchange rate.  The use of the real exchange rate to achievecompetitiveness or to reduce inflation has had important real effects.
1 Another important
characteristic of Chile's exchange rate policies is the existence of strong restrictions on
foreign exchange transactions for most of the time from 1960 to 1990, with the exception of
the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Almost complete liberalization of foreign exchange markets
has taken place in the 1990s.
2.1 Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes
In order to classify exchange rate regimes, this work distinguishes four different exchange
rate
regimes, which will be defined by a discrete variable (1 to 4).  They are:
1. Fixed exchange rate regimes.   These are usually implemented to achieve low
inflation, and are also characterized by a liberalization of most foreign exchange
transactions, and consequently, unification of exchange rate market.  During these
periods there was also liberalization (partial) of capital flows.  The two experiences
in Chile only differ in that during the first, Chile was a relatively closed economy
emerging from import substitution strategies, while during the second experience,
the economy was fairly open.  However, in both cases there was a tendency toward
more openness.
2. Crisis management.   These are usually periods during which the authorities
adopted some form of floating exchange rate and the introduction of segmentation
in foreign exchange markets.  These periods follow exchange rate crises.  At this
stage there is no clear exchange rate regime.  They are only attempts to control the
loss of reserves, rising inflation, and financial distress.
3. Crawling peg cum exchange rate controls.   These basically consist of small
devaluations of the exchange rate according to some rule oriented to keep some
level for the real exchange rate.  The exchange rate can be fixed at the level of the
crawling peg or it can be allowed to float within a narrow band.  Most crawling peg
episodes have been characterized by segmentation in the foreign exchange market.
4. Wide band.  This is a system of implementing a wide exchange rate band around
some central parity with few controls on the foreign exchange rate market.  The
central parity can be chosen in a manner similar to that of the crawling peg, but the
exchange rate is allowed to float in a wide range.  This is the closest that the
Chilean economy has been to a floating regime.
                                                       
1 For descriptions of exchange rates policies see Ffrench-Davis (1973, 1979), De Gregorio (1986), Edwards
and
Cox-Edwards (1987), Dombusch and Edwards (1 994), Meller (1990), Williamson (1996) and Cowan and
De Gregorio (1998).Table I presents the classification of the exchange rate regime according to these
categories.  The reasons for this classification, and the description of exchange rate policies,
are discussed in what follows.
2.2 Exchange Rate Policies: 1960-1996
The sixties started with a fixed-exchange rate regime.  In order to achieve price stability,
after
a 18% devaluation in late 1958 and 25% in January 1959, the exchange rate was fixed at
1.05 Escudos per US dollar in January 1959.  The foreign exchange market was unified, and
free access to it was established.  Between 1960 and 1962 there was a 12% real
appreciation, a decline in inflation and a sharp increase in the deficit in the current account.
With the external situation deteriorating and after completing the liberalization of foreign
exchange, 1962 started with a reversal of liberalization, and the reintroduction of foreign
trade restrictions.  The exchange rate system was abandoned in October 1962, and in the
next couple of years exchange rate policy and capital account management were oriented to
close the external gap.  Restrictions in the foreign exchange market were reintroduced and
intensified during 1963-64.
The crawling peg system was initiated in April 1965, with a couple of small
devaluations per month.  The policy remained essentially the same until 1970, with varying
degree of restrictions on foreign exchange and foreign trade, depending to a large extent on
short-term balance of payments conditions.  For these reasons, for example, in 1967 and
after a deteriorating external situation, restrictions were tightened.  By the late sixties there
were three official exchange rates: one rate for most trade transactions, the "corredores"
rate, a second one that applied to the banking system and it was mainly used for financial
obligations, and the last one for copper exports.  The exchange rate for copper exports was
in practice a tax, although small, In the period 1963-65 this dual system was used more
intensely as the economy entered into a balance of payments crisis.  The gap between the
general exchange rate for exports and the one for copper was in average 1 1% during this
period, while the maximum was in 1964, when it reached 18%.
In late 1970, right after the beginning of Allende's government, there was a new attempt
to fix the exchange rate, but the rapid rise in inflation caused a substantial real appreciation.
The policy response was to devalue and to increase segmentation in the foreign exchange
market.  By 1973 there were at least six official exchange rates with a ratio of 1:52 between
the maximum and the minimum.  By that time there was also massive intervention in foreign
trade.  The average tariff was around 100%.
It is worthwhile to note that according to Figure 1 the real exchange rate during the
sixties was substantially lower than the real exchange rate post- 1974.  As mentioned above,
multiple exchange rates with a number of restrictions and trade protection may have allowed
the economy to have such an appreciated real exchange rate without wide current account
deficit.After the militaries took power in 1973 the first measure in the exchange rate front was
a 300% devaluation for the most important exchange rates to restore competitiveness.  The
multiple exchange rate regime was collapsed to just three rates.  A crawling peg with four
devaluations a month was implemented, but with different adjustments for the different rates
with the purpose of achieving exchange rate unification.  In August 1974 the exchange rate
for copper exports was unified, remaining only two exchange rates.  The final unification
occurred one year later.  Macroeconomic discipline was achieved, but inflation was still
high, despite the large decline in activity.  By 1974 the real exchange rate reached its
maximum depreciation level since the 1960s.
By 1976 and 1977 inflation was still high.  In 1976 inflation was still three-digit and in
1977 it declined to 64%.  During these years the crawling peg system was based on
preannounced daily devaluations and indexed to domestic inflation.  But in June 1976 and
March 1977 two 10% revaluations were implemented, officially justified by the fact that the
real exchange rate was too depreciated and the external conditions would allow for an
appreciation.
In February 1978 the system of daily indexed devaluations was abandoned by a "tablita"
that set the rate of crawl according to inflationary targets.  The "tablita" was announced to
start with a 2.5% monthly devaluation starting in February and ending at 0.75% in the last
quarter of 1978.  Inflation still remained high and stabilized at around 30%, despite the
reduction in the rate of nominal devaluation.  In late 1978 a "tablita" for 1979, with a 15%
devaluation, was announced.  Despite the attempt to reduce inflation through the reduction
in the rate for devaluation, inflation was still high. 1978 closed with 30% inflation, the same
rate prevailing in June 1979.
With disappointing progress on inflation, the exchange rate was fixed in June 1979.
The value of the dollar was set at $ 39, which was 6% higher than the prevailing tablita.
The rest of the story is well-known.  After deteriorating internal and external conditions, the
fixed exchange rate regime collapsed in June 1982.
The devaluation of 1982 was followed by a period of instability, with discrete
devaluations, a short period of floating, segmentation of the foreign exchange rate market
and so on.  In August 1982 the exchange rate was again set according to a crawling peg
based on a PPP-rule.  Although the rules have changed, the basic mechanism of daily mini-
devaluations, initiated in the sixties, has been kept until today.  During the crisis of the early
eighties and in order to help firms under financial distress because of high leverage in dollars,
several programs to help debtors were implemented, which are discussed below.
In late September 1982 the exchange rate was allowed to move within a narrow band of
+2%, which has been widening since then.  The central parity has been determined according
to daily  devaluations based on the differentials between domestic and foreign inflation.
There have been changes in the rate of crawl as well as the basket of currencies used to set
the central parity.After stability returned to exchange rate policy, several devaluations were implemented
during the 1980s, in addition to the daily mini devaluations.  The first one was 23.7% in
September 1984, 9% in February 1985, and 5% in June 1985.
The crawling rate has been set following a PPP rule.  Devaluations have been done on a
daily basis as the difference between domestic inflation and foreign inflation, which in terms
of US dollars was estimated at annual rates of 1% when the system was reintroduced.  In
March 1983 the discount was set to zero to induce a depreciation.  Then, in 1985 a 0.6% as
foreign inflation was discounted, and later rates of 3.6%, 0%, and 1.2% were used to finally
reach 2.4%, which has been used since July 1992.
In late 1995 a downward drift (appreciation) of 2% was added to the PPP rule.  That is,
the discount allowed for an "equilibrium" 2% real appreciation in the central parity, that is a
PPP-2% rule.  The central parity has been set according to a basket of currencies, but the
weights have been changed in different occasions.
Regarding the width of the band, when it first was implemented in September 1982, a
±2% width around the central parity was set.  In mid 1989 the band was widened to ±5%,
further to +10% in January of 1992 and to ±12.5% in January 1997.  As in the 1980s the
central parity has been changed on several occasions during the 1990s, but they have been
revaluations instead of devaluations.  There have been four revaluations: in June 1991 the
central parity was revalued by 2%, then revalued 5 % in January 1992, 1 0% in December
1994, and finally in January 1997 it was revalued by 5 %.
The period from the debt crisis up to 1990 was a period in which the continuous
devaluations of the nominal exchange rate were able to achieve a continuous real
depreciation.  Devaluation without inflation was achieved because the  devaluations
contributed mainly to correcting a large misalignment in the early 1980s.
2 Between 1981 and
1988, the period of persistent depreciation, the average devaluation was 30% per year,
whilst average inflation was only 20% per year.  It is interesting to note that the real
depreciation continued even in the second part of the 1980s, where there was no need to
devalue discretely.  The depreciation of the dollar in the second half of the 1980s, after the
sharp appreciation of the first half of the 1980s, allowed to have a depreciating rate with
respect to the dollar, an even lower inflation rate and a depreciation of the real exchange
rate.
Since 1990, the situation has reverted, and exchange rates have started appreciating.
The economy had reached full employment by 1988, external accounts appear to be sound
and productivity growth has been important.  Chile has also returned to voluntary capital
markets.  In this context, tensions in the exchange rate market appeared and the period of
"high" (depreciated) real
                                                       
2 For details on real exchange rates determninants see De Gregorio (1996) and C6spedes and De Gregorio
(1999).exchange rate ended.  During 1990-96 the real exchange rate appreciated at an average
annual rate of 4.6%.
An important policy implemented during the 1990s, with controversial degree of
success, has been an unremunerated reserve requirement on most capital inflows, that
currently amounts to an entry fee of about 3%.  This has been used as a complement to
macroeconomic policy, with the objective to allow tight monetary policy with a '(.weak"
currency.
3. The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Regimes
Decisions on exchange rate policy, and in particular the objective of the policy in terms of
achieving certain level for the real exchange rate and its interaction with other objectives,
such as promoting specific sectors or controlling inflation, are not taken in isolation.  The
choices are not necessarily the technically "optimal" ones, since they are many times
subordinated to other objectives and the result of interactions among different interest
groups.  In this section I explore some political economy factors that underlie the exchange
rate regimes in Chile.  In this respect it is important to show how the system evolved from
import substitution to liberalized trade.  The exchange rate played an important role as a
compensation mechanism.  Another important feature in Chile was the evolution of the
exchange rate system from one that was competitiveness-oriented to an anti inflation-
oriented one.  In all of these cases there were political economy factors, ideas, and
institutions that helped determine the specific choices.
4.1 From Import Substitution to Liberalization
During the 1960s and until 1974, Chile was a leading example of inward-looking
development based on import substitution.  Therefore, the exchange rate had to
accommodate this strategy.  Although the crawling peg was introduced in the 1960s to
preserve competitiveness and stability, Figure I shows that the real exchange rate was very
appreciated compared to post-1974 levels.  This was sustained, to avoid excessive imports
and an unsustainable external imbalance, by high tariffs and other trade restrictions.
A clear description of the interactions between the exchange rate regime and the trade
regime is in the speech given in 1976 by Sergio de Castro, one of the leading figures of
Chile's trade liberalization.  He was explaining the problems Chile had with the Andean Pact
in order to liberalize its trade regime.  On imports substitution and appreciation he said that:
"Obviously policy [appreciated exchange rate] allowed for the import of capital
goods and raw materials at relatively low prices, which were needed for
industrialization that was being encouraged.  As a result, ... it also motivated
importing of all sorts of goods.  If the policy had been maintained, it would
obviously have created a large deficit in the balance of payments.  In order to avoid
this, a tariff policy was applied which consisted in prohibiting or in applyingextremely high duties on those products that could be produced domestically" (de
Castro, 1976).
And regarding exchange rate and trade regime he went on to argue that:
"It should be emphasized that the exchange rate policy and the tariff policy are
indissolubly bound together in an inverse relationship... In this way the lack of
protection which may affect a particular sector when the tariffs are lowered is
compensated for in part by the additional protection afforded by what should be an
automatic rise in the rate of exchange rate in real terms."
Therefore, the exchange rate regime prevailing until 1978 was clearly oriented to
compensate the industrial sector, and other protected ones, for the loss of protection.
3 It was
also oriented toward promote exports.  Of course, as basic open macro theory would
suggest a depreciation of the real exchange rate is the natural outcome of trade
liberalization, and hence the objectives of the authorities were consistent with expected
outcomes.  The objective of achieving competitiveness was already evident in "El Ladrillo,"
the name given to the document prepared by the Chicago boys during Allende's government
and is considered to be the economic program of the military regime.
4  According to this
document:
"The maintenance of the exchange rate in real terms is an indispensable requisite to
move significant amount of resources to the exports industry.  In consequence, and
while stability ofprices is still not achieved [italicized by author], it is indispensable
that the Central Bank continue devaluing periodically and with necessary frequency
to avoid large devaluations or predictable ones that could induce speculation... It is
fundamental that the exchange rate policy does not change... If, for example, it is
expected that the exchange rate will increase less than domestic prices [real
appreciation], there will be a devastating [funesto] effect in the allocation of
resources since the risk of investing in the export sector will be increased..."
It was clear that the intention of opening up the economy and compensating the reduced
protection, as well as promoting exports, with the exchange rate.  However, the exchange
rate was not the only compensation given to entrepreneurs in order to have su port for the
reforms, in particular the opening up of the economy.  Reforms were deep and widespread
and several other mechanisms had to be used.  Edwards and Lederman (1998) provide an
insightful discussion on the political economy of Chile's trade reform.  In a relatively short
period of time, from 1974 to 1979 5 tariffs were drastically reduced--from an average I 00%
and many selective controls to a flat IO% and no other controls--and it was possible because
                                                       
3 It is disputable when authorities changed from the compensation objective to the anti-inflation objective,
since already in February 1978 the tablita was implemented, anchoring the rate of crawl to future expected
inflation.  However, the regime in 1978 is classified as a crawling peg, although it moved to a fixed-
exchange rate regime.
4 The document was called "Economic Program for Development" and given to important figures in the
military government in September 1973.existed the necessary support to undertake the reform.  Some of the components of the
reform program provided compensations to the private sector.  This is the case of a large
scale privatization, some of which were at a bargain (Hachette and  Luders, 1992), and
financial liberalization, which allowed existing and emerging conglomerates to participate in
financial activities, heavily intervened pre-1974.  On the other hand, more direct
compensation mechanisms were the repression of labor unions and the appointment of
leaders of the entrepreneurial associations to the cabinet.  The first important case was the
appointment of the leader of the organization of farmers as Minister of Agriculture.  This
mechanism was regularly used to build support for the reforms among the private sector
(Campero, 1991).
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that reforms were also favored by the fact that
the country was in one of its deepest economic and political crises of the century in 1973,
and therefore there was ample room and popular support to introduce drastic reforms.
Summarizing, one can argue that the from 1974 to 1979 the exchange rate regime was
consistent with the compensation needed to implement a deep trade reform and the drastic
switch from import substitution to outward-oriented development.
3.2 Inflation and Fixed Exchange Rate
As described in section 2, since 1978 the exchange rate policy started shifting toward an
anti-
inflation objective, which culminated with the fixed-exchange rate from June 1979 to June
1982.  From a political economy point of view two are the main issues that arise in this
period.  The first one is why after a strong position favoring competitiveness there was the
change of emphasis to use the exchange rate as the anchor to fight inflation.  The second
issue is which were the compensation mechanism used to keep support for the economic
program after several years of pro-competitiveness discourse.  Now I examine them in turn.
Regarding the change of emphasis in the role of exchange rate policy it is difficult to
find a strong answer and there are least three important aspects that may help to explain this
change:
•  The role of ideas.  Actually the economic team was mostly educated at Chicago
University.  As clear from "El Ladrillo" (see italicized in quotation above) the crawling
peg, or minidevaluations, was thought as a good tool before achieving price stability.  In
a more stable situation there was the believe that inflation would quickly converge to
international levels.  According to a high official, Julio Dittbom deputy director of the
planning office (ODEPLAN) by that time, "in the light of existing information ... fixing
the exchange rate would lead us quickly to domestic inflation similar to international
inflation" (cited by Arellano and Cortazar, 1982).  Thus the issue of real appreciation
was not considered to be important.  Moreover, the real exchange rate was at record
levels (depreciated), and hence, there was room for some appreciation.•  Inflationary disappointment and temptation.  After a shock treatment to reduce inflation
in 1974, with a money-based stabilization, progress in inflation was moderate.  By the
end of 1976 inflation was 174%, and in 1977 declined to 64%.  Thus, moving to an
exchange rate-based stabilization, under the view that the law of one price should hold,
could help to bring progress faster.  Indeed in 1978 inflation decreased to 30%.  It is
important, however, to note that the decision to fix the exchange rate was taken before
achieving price stability, since by June 1979 yearly inflation was still 30%.
•  The external environment was suitable.  As large amounts of funds in the world were
available for developing countries and at the same time Chile's financial markets were
open to the rest of the world.  Financing a widening current account was not seen as a
problem.
The 1979-82 experience has some similarities with the fixed exchange rate of the late fifties
in
terms of "inflationary disappointment." From 1955 to 1958 in Chile was the "Mision Klein-
Sacks." This was an economic program designed by an American consulting firm, previously
working in Peru.  They proposed a broad reform program, that showed partial success
(Ffrench-Davies, 1973).  After reducing inflation from levels around 70-80% in 1954-55 to
17% in 1957, inflation jumped again to around 30% in 1958.  Notable inflationary success
was achieved in 1960-61, when the exchange rate was fixed and inflation declined to 5.5%
and 9.5%, figures not seen in Chile during the post-war period and not seen again until the
1990s.
5
In the context of an appreciating exchange rate and a pro-openness objective one may
wonder how it was possible to sustain the fixed exchange rate regime of the late seventies-
early eighties.  First of all, the main "compensation" was a boom of economic activity.  This
boom was associated with the stabilization program and it is a typical consequence of
exchange rate-based disinflations (see Calvo and Vegh, 1998).  The average rate of growth
during 1977-81 was 7.9%. Growth was particularly important toward the early 1980s since
at the beginning it was the recovery from the 1974 recession.  This compares strikingly with
a -3.2% average decline in output in the previous years.
6 Low tariffs and an appreciating
exchange rate also allowed for cheap imports, for consumer goods as well as inputs for the
industrial sector.  All of this economic scenario, with strong growth of output, and even
stronger for consumption, generated ample support for the stabilization strategy.
7
                                                       
5 A difference in the two cases is that the crisis of 1962 was clearly caused by a fiscal imbalance, with a
fiscal deficit, about 5% of GDP, while the crisis in 1982 was with fiscal surplus, but with a financial crisis,
closest to Asian-crisis of today.
6 Similarly, in the early sixties, an expansion of output gave support to the fixed exchange rate regime, since
output grew 4.4% in the period 1959-62, compared to 1.8% in the previous four years.  However, the
currency crisis of 1962 did not end up in a large recession, since output kept growing strong in subsequent
years.
7 In 1980 there was a plebiscite to approve a new Constitution, and the results, despite the legitimacy of the
election, showed that the government large popular support, and certainly the economic situation was key for
this.There were additional reasons why there was still support for the fixed exchange rate.
Edwards and Lederman (1998) stress the fact that the opening of the capital account and the
liberalization of financial markets allowed the big "grupos" to obtain financing abroad at
very convenient conditions, when domestic interest rate (lending) where very high.
Therefore, while having troubles in their tradable activities, corporate conglomerates were
able to obtain financing, to make profits in their nontradable businesses, and to enjoy large
spreads in interest rates domestically.  The appointment of entrepreneurs to the cabinet
continued, making them to be involved in policy making and being partners in the main
decisions.
As the crisis was on its way by late 1981, support started declining.  It is interesting, for
example, that Jorge Alessandri--president of Chile during from 1958 to 1964 and one of the
main figures among entrepreneurs--criticized the economic situation in the eve of the
devaluation of 1982 (El Mercurio, 17 of April).  Although he did not ask directly for a
devaluation, he suggested that tariffs could be increased.  The official line was of course just
to argue that a devaluation would be chaos, only inflation, and hence, not a valid option.
3.3 Crisis and Compensations Again.  An Example: Subsidies to Debtors in the Crisis of
1982
After the devaluation of 1982, the government needed to rebuild support to undertake an
adjustment and to make sure that the social discontent didn't threaten the military regime.
Indeed, 1983 was perhaps the year where the military government was under the biggest
threat.  One solution was to go back to partial populism and appointing ministers "more
pragmatic," in opposition to the Chicago boys.  They raised tariffs and introduce several
measures to alleviate the situation of particular groups.  But they did not have the strength,
or perhaps the intention, to change the basis of the economic model.
In the aftermath of the crisis, several measures were announced to compensate losses
and the costs arisen from the break of the commitment with the exchange rate.
8 Although
the crisis was widespread and deep, and far from being beneficial to anyone, some early
announcements may also have helped to defend the model among entrepreneurs.  Just a
couple of days after the devaluation, the finance Minister announced the privatization of
public enterprises, such as an electric company (Chilectra), the telephone company, and a
maritime shipping firm.
Although many instruments were used to obtain support for the adjustment and
privatization, particular schemes were implemented to alleviate debtors and manage the
crisis to avoid a major collapse.  After allowing the exchange rate to float in August 1982,
the authorities decided to implement a "preferential exchange rate system" for all debts in
                                                       
8 To many, one of the main difficulties faced in the early 1980s was the inability of wages to adjust, since
labor
legislation imposed 100% indexation as a floor for new negotiations.  Therefore, one of the first measures
implemented after the devaluation was the elimination of the automatic wage adjustments.foreign exchange (or denominated in foreign exchange) contracted before August 1982 with
financial institutions operating in Chile or directly with foreign banks.  The preferential
exchange rate could be used to pay interest and principal, and no pre payment was allowed.
The "preferential exchange rate" was determined as the exchange rate that would have
prevailed in August 6th of 1982 if the policy of mini  devaluations would have been
maintained, expressed in UF,
9 with a 5% surcharge.
Since the mini devaluations rule were applied with a discount for foreign inflation, the
preferential and the official exchange rate would have converged.  However, the existence of
the preferential exchange rate, pegged in UFs, imposed constraints on the ability of the
Central Bank to conduct exchange rate policy since each time it would decide to devalue it
would widen the gap between both exchange rates.  This was what actually happened.  The
gap (official exchange rate/preferential exchange rate), that started at about 26% and
declined systematically to 17% in mid1984, increase sharply after the  devaluations of
September 1984, and February and June of 1985, reaching a maximum of 63% in July 1985.
The forms of payment, from cash to bonds, and the eligibility for the preferential
exchange rate were changed during its application.  The most important change was the
exclusion of exporters in early 1984, since they were benefiting from the depreciations of the
exchange rate.  In June 1985 it was announced the gradual elimination of the preferential
exchange rate, by reducing linearly the gap, which was supposed to disappear in December
1986.
Although the preferential exchange rate was the main subsidy to debtors, in September
1984 a "dedollarization" of debts was allowed.  Debtors could refinance their debts at an
exchange rate of 93$/US$, instead of the post-devaluation rate of 115$/US$.  There was a
maximum allowed for these operations and special treatment for debts under the preferential
exchange rate system.
The amount of these subsidies was sizable.  Between 1982 and 1985 the subsidy for the
preferential exchange rate was $2.9 billions and the dedollarization of 1984 cost was $232
millions.  The average costs of these two mechanisms was on average 3.5% of GDP per year
between 1982 and 1986.
The appreciation during the period June 1979 to June 1982 was popular.  They initially
enjoyed popular support because cheap imports and financing were available.  The
devaluation came at a moment were it was broadly seen as inevitable.  However, it ewas a
huge change in the rules of the game.  These arrangements, for the highly indebted in foreign
exchange, are an example of how the losers, in particular the sizable ones, are compensated
to keep support to existing policies.
3.4 Back to Competitiveness
Since 1982 and after a period of instability, exchange rate policy returned to a crawling peg
                                                       
9 “Unidad de Fomento” is a unit of account indexed daily to the variation of the CPI in the previous month.system.  During the second half of the eighties the economy recovered strongly after the
1982-83 recession, with strong growth of exports and with a very depreciated real exchange
rate (Fig. 1), which according to the official measure that includes all main trading partners
reached its historical heights by 1990.  This set the stage for the economic program of
Aylwin's administration, the first elected president after the military regime.  Regarding
exchange rate policy the program was very clear:
"It must be kept a stable real exchange rate that stimulates efficiently exports and
efficient import substitution."
The commitment with a depreciated exchange rate was strong, although unsuccessful,
as the real exchange rate appreciated.  As shown below, this was the result of an
undervalued currency in 1990.  The lack of capital flows in the eighties allowed an artificially
depreciated real exchange rate.  But, as capital inflows resumed with force in the early
nineties, and the economy kept growing, the real exchange rate appreciated.  There has been
a trend appreciation between 4 and 5% during the nineties, and it has not been possible for
the authorities to stop it.
Even the  Frei administration that began in 1994 was strong in its desire to avoid
appreciation.  The finance Minister announced, in his first important speech, in the meeting
called "Entrepreneurs of the World" that the government would seek a stable real exchange
rate.  But the real appreciation continued.  Flexibilization of the exchange rate band, that had
a center crawling with PPP, has been introduced in order to permit the exchange rate to
appreciate.
There have been two main instruments to avoid and slow down the real appreciation.
First, there has been a massive accumulation of reserves.  And second, capital controls in
1991 were introduced in 1991 and revised definitely in 1992 to slow down inflows.  An
unremunerated reserve requirement of 30% for one year for capital inflows, with some
exceptions and loopholes, was introduced.  As time went on and loopholes were discovered,
the mechanism has been perfected, mainly through the increase of its scope.  By 1998, the
reserve requirement covered most inflows, with the exception of foreign direct investment
and the issue of new stocks sold as ADRs abroad.  In June 1998 the reserve requirement
was reduced to 10%.
Regarding compensations, two aspects need to be mentioned:
•  The average rate of annual growth of the economy in the last ten years has been about
8%.  Therefore the claims for compensation are rather weak.  Even at the agriculture
sector, perhaps the one with greatest difficulties, has faced problems asking for
compensation since its productivity and production have grown strongly.  Therefore, as
in the late seventies and early eighties with the appreciation during the fixed exchange
rate period, strong growth was reduced the strength of complaints.  Moreover, the
official position has usually been that appreciation is not a serious problem since the
economy and the tradable goods sector have been growing at healthy rates.•  From the point of view of big conglomerates and the leadership of  entrepreneurs
organizations, there are also some similarities with the appreciation of the early eighties.
Despite capital controls, large firms with access to international financial markets could
get long term financing at international rates with a small fee from the unremunerated
reserve requirement, which is declining with the length of the borrowing.  Adding an
appreciating exchange rate, the cost of financing has been very low.
4. The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes: Preliminaries
Before proceeding with the determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in the next
section, this section presents the data, some basic  correlations between exchange rate
policies and trade policies, and measures of misalignment that will be used later.
4.1 The Data
In general exchange rate policies are designed in conjunction with other policies.  In
particular, as evident from the Chilean experience discussed in the previous sections, the
degree of openness, foreign exchange controls, and controls on capital flows are very related
to exchange rate policies.  The first set of variables account for policies related directly to
the exchange rate regime.  They are:
1  Black market premium, which indicates the tightness of foreign exchange and capital
controls. It has also been used as an indicator of overall distortions of economic policy.
2  Tariffs.  I use the average level of tariffs.
3  Quantitative  restrictions indices, in addition to tariffs several quantitative restrictions
have been used to regulate trade flows in Chile.  There is one index for imports and the
other for exports.  The later was only used for 1960-62.  The indices are updated from
Ffrench-Davis (1973) and de la Cuadra and Hachette (1990), and take values between 0
and 20, where 20 indicates the absence of quantitative controls.
4  Trade liberalization index, which is updated from de la Cuadra and Hachette (1990) and
summarizes all the previous indicators to measure the degree of trade openness and
distortions on foreign exchange markets.
The second set of variables can be interpreted as variables related to economic
fundamentals.
Figures 2 to 7 show the evolution of the main variables.  The variables are:
5  Terms of trade, based on Central Bank and World Bank data.
6  Fiscal variables: overall fiscal surplus and the ratio of government consumption to GDP.7  Current account deficit as percentage of GDP.
8  Inflation: CPI inflation.
9  Unemployment rate: unemployment rate of the Great Santiago is used, instead of
national figures, because this is the only series for which data since 1960 are available.
10  GDP growth and GDP per worker.
11  Reserves as a percentage of MI and M2 in order to have a measure of external
vulnerability.
12  Net foreign assets: this is net foreign assets of 1960 plus accumulated current account
deficit, taken from Bronner, Loayza and Lopez (1997).
13  External environment: measures of international inflation (US CPI), copper prices, and
percentage of countries with fixed-exchange rate regime (from Goldfajn and  Valdes,
1998), were used as external indicators.  In particular, the latter variable was used to
indicate world trends on macroeconomic management.
Some of the previous variables could be given also a political economy interpretation.  For
example, inflation may be related to "fundamentals" because it may reflect weakness of fiscal
policy, while it could be interpreted as a political economy variable related to the weight the
economy places on inflation vis-a-vis unemployment.  Fiscal policy variables, unemployment
and net foreign assets (external indebtedness) could also be related to political economy
factors.  Political economy factors are also related to characteristics of the economic
structure and some institutional factors.  Several variables were constructed, and the ones
that were used in the empirical investigation are:
14  Structure of the economy.  Data on composition of output and employment by main
sectors of economic activity were constructed.  Both variables present a similar
evolution over time, and hence, the share of output of manufacturing and the share of
exports on GDP were used to measure the relative importance of the import substitution
and the export sector, respectively.
10  Io The reason for this classification is that in Chile
exports have  been traditionally associated to mining and agriculture, while
manufacturing has been traditionally a sector producing imports substitutes.  All of these
data were based on national accounts.  In addition,, line 22d of IFS as a share of GDP,
was used to measure financial development.   More precisely, development of the
banking system.  This variable corresponds to the claims of the banking system
(excluding the central bank) on non-banking private sector as a fraction of GDP.
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10 It is possible that during large recessions the increase in the share of a particular sector may be the result
of a decline in GDP rather than a trend increase in the production of that sector.  For this reason I used
alternatively shares of sectors constructed with respect to a HP filtered measure of the GDP.  However, the
results did not change significantly.15  Data on the importance of labor unions are scarce and unreliable.  A series on
unionization (percent of the labor force belonging to unions) was constructed based on
data of the Ministry of Labor.  However, because of inconsistencies in the series, the
data for 1974-79 were assumed to be constant and equal to the value of 1980, which is
13%, while in 1973 was 24%.  So it was assumed that from 1974 to 1980 unionization
was constant at 13%, a substantial drop considering that unionization was increasing
since 1960.  Some scattered data on number of strikes as well as number of unions were
obtained, but not with enough observations or reliability to use them in the empirical
section.
4.2. Exchange and Trade Policies
As was discussed previously, the exchange rate regime is classified in four categories,
fixed exchange rate, management after a crisis, crawling peg with exchange rate controls,
and a wide exchange rate band, which is the closest to a floating regime.  Tables 2, 3, and 4
are contingency tables for the exchange rate regime and other indicators of economic policy.
Each entry represents the number of years (37 in total) where a given regime coincides with
a given range for the other variables.  At the bottom of each table are the averages for each
variable across regimes and its standard deviation (s.d.).
Table 2 shows the relationship with the average level of tariffs, where the level of
tariffs is divided in ranges from 0 to 20%, from 20 to 70% and 70 to I IO%.  As can be
seen from the table, there was also a crisis with high tariffs.  Whether high tariffs were a
response to the crisis or part of a more overall policy stance regarding foreign trade is not
clear.  Indeed the three observations for very high tariffs coincide with the years 1971-73,
where the economy becomes more closed to foreign trade and macroeconomic
management was out of control.  However, it is natural to think that increased tariffs are a
normal response to currency crises to control currency depreciation.  This happened in
Chile in the 1980s after the debt crisis.  The crawling peg system is one that is aimed at
keeping competitiveness, and it has been used in periods of tariffs in the low and middle
range.  During the 1990s tariffs have been low and the exchange rate regime has been of a
wide band.
Similarly, for the trade liberalization index (Table 3) similar patterns are observed.
Recall that the higher the value of the index, the more open is the economy.  Regarding
crises we observe that, in addition to the early 70s, there is a reaction toward reducing the
degree of openness, since out of the 6 cases, 5 of them happened with the index between 1
and 8. The periods of fixed exchange rate regime occurred with both relatively open (early
1980s) and relatively closed (early 1960s) economies.  However, and as I discussed in the
review of the experiences, in both experiences there was a tendency was toward
liberalization.
Finally, Table 4, I compare the exchange rate regime with the black market premium.
Unification of foreign exchange rate market was a characteristic of the two periods withfixed exchange rates.  As the table shows they were also periods with a low black market
premium, except in the eve of the crisis of the early 60s were the premium started increasing
before the abandonment of the regime, and foreign exchange controls were used to defend
the currency.  As expected, crises have a high BMP, in most of the cases above 50%.
Crawling peg periods have low, moderate and high exchange rate premium.  Finally the
experience of the 1990s show small black market premia.
Overall, the results, although with few data, show some interesting relations.  There is a
tendency to have a more closed economy and high black market premium in times of crisis.
There is an attempt toward increased liberalization in periods of fixed exchange rates.
Crawling peg has been used during periods of middle range and low tariff, and the wide
band has been used in a period of significant openness.  Overall, one could preliminarily
conclude that more flexible exchange rate regimes have prevailed when the economy is more
open, and the political economy interpretation would suggest that this is done in order to
keep competitiveness.  Below a more complete analysis is presented on the relationship
between exchange rate regime, other economic and political economy variables.
4.3. Measuring Real Exchange Rate Misalignment
A key variable needed to analyze the choice of the exchange rate regime is the degree of
exchange rate misalignment.  To construct a measure of misalignment, we need to define
some equilibrium real exchange rate (q*) and compare it with the actual real exchange rate
(q).  More precisely we define the misalignment, M, as q-q*, where the real exchange rate is
measured as the units of domestic goods per unit of foreign goods (ep*/p).  Therefore, a
negative value for M implies an overvalued currency (the real exchange rate is "too low" or
appreciated), while a positive one represents an undervalued exchange rate.
The first thing estimated equilibrium real exchange rate did was estimate a structural
equation for the real exchange rate (log).  Then, the predicted value was smoothed using an
HP filter.  That value was considered the equilibrium real exchange rate.  Assuming a
smooth real exchange rate allows persistent real exchange rate misalignments, something
that has characterized the Chilean economy in the period of this study.  The regressions were
performed for the entire sample: 1960-96.  In order to have reasonable estimates a dummy
variable for the constant and for the fiscal variable for the post- 1974 period was introduced.
During the sixties and early seventies there were multiple exchange rates, low degree of
openness and pervasive capital controls which make difficult to think there was a stable
relationship for the real exchange rate.
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The explanatory variables in the real exchange rate equations are:
                                                       
11 In a previous version, regressions for the period 1974-96 were estimated and used in the analysis of the
next section.  For the period 1960-74 the variable misalignment was not used.  In this version the entire
sample is used for the rest of the papers, and the results do not change significantly when a restricted sample
is used.(1) GDP per worker, as a measure of productivity and to capture the  Balassa-
Samuelson effect, by which higher levels of productivity (in the tradable goods sector
compared to the non-tradable goods sector and across countries) imply a more appreciated
real exchange rate.  One should rigorously compare domestic productivity against
productivity in the rest of the world.  This was found to work better for the entire sample
from 1960 to 1996.
(2) Government consumption over GDP, as a measure of pressures on the relative
price of non tradables as long as the government spends a larger fraction of GDP in non
tradables.  This variable may also capture the inter-temporal effects of increases in
government expenditure.  This variable is measured based on IFS data for government final
consumption, which is, on average, about 12% in the estimation period.  The fiscal surplus
was also used as a proxy for the effects of fiscal policy.
(3) Net foreign assets (log).  The need to generate current account surpluses of an
economy depends on its net assets position with the rest of the world.  If net assets are
positive and large, the economy will have an appreciated real exchange rate since it will need
less surpluses to pay back debts, and hence we expect a negative sign.  This series is
constructed as the accumulated current account surplus, starting with an estimate in 1960.
(4) Terms of trade (log).  Depending on the strength of income and substitution
effects, the sign may be either positive or negative, but in general one would expect the sign
to be negative, that is an improvement in the terms of trade cause an appreciation (De
Gregorio and Wolf, 1994).
(5) Finally, an indicator of openness was used to capture the fact that more open
economies should have a more depreciated real exchange rate.  As economies are more
open, they need more resources to be devoted to the tradable goods sector in order to keep
full employment, and hence, the real exchange rate must appreciate.  However, this variable
is also amenable to political economy factors.  In an open economy, more sensitivity with
tradable goods sector will tend to favor a weak currency.  In addition, import substitution
sectors, the most affected by the reduction of tariffs,, can be implicitly compensated with a
weak currency.
The results from the estimations of equilibrium real exchange rates are presented in Table 5.
We use the multilateral real exchange rate published by the Central Bank.  In general the
results are in line with the theoretical predictions and with other estimations for the Chilean
economy, although neither the terms of trade nor government expenditure were statistically
significant.  As said before, the fiscal surplus was only significant post-1974.  The rest of the
coefficients have the expected sign.  An increase in labor productivity (measured in
logarithmic form) in Chile produces a real appreciation, while an increase in foreign
productivity produces a real depreciation, both results consistent with the  Balassa-
Samuelson effect.  Moreover, when entered the difference in labor productivity, in
regression (3), the coefficient is about -1.  That is, a 1% increase in relative productivity
produces a 1% appreciation.  An increase in net foreign liabilities induces depreciation.  A10% increase in foreign liabilities leads to a depreciation of 1.5%. The only fiscal variable
significant was the budget surplus post-1974, which indicates that an increase in the surplus
of 1% of GDP leads to a 1% real depreciation.  Finally, openness, measured by the index of
liberalization plays also a significant role in the real exchange rate.  A larger degree of
openness is associated with a more depreciated real exchange rate.  As was explained above,
the trade liberalization of the seventies was accompanied with a deliberate effort to keep a
depreciated real exchange rate.  Of course, there are theoretical reasons that explain why
this attempt was successful, since a reduction of tariffs is associated with a depreciated real
exchange rate.  As argued above, it was also consistent with the need to compensate import
substitution industries from the loss of competitiveness stemming from the reduction of
protection.
In order to measure the misalignment I use regression (3), although the results are not
very different when computed with other regressions.  The misalignment series is plotted in
Figure 8. The stabilization of the mid 1970s resulted in a very depreciated real exchange
rate, which started appreciating significantly with the tablita, and then, after the debt crisis
depreciated also substantially, to start appreciating again in the early 1990s but with a more
flexible exchange rate regime.  The Chilean experience is one where misaligmnents tend to
be very persistent (see Bronner, Loayza and Lopez, 1997).
4.4. A First Look at the Data
With the basic data for the analysis, I first have a look at the behavior of the variables
across the different exchange rate regimes.  This is done in Table 6. Inflation has been lower
in the band period, which corresponds to the 1990s.  It is interesting to note, that the periods
of crawling peg are characterized by higher inflation and lower growth than the periods of
fixed exchange rate.  But, both periods of fixed exchange rate ended up in a crisis, which is
an indication of the boom-bust cycle of exchange rate-based stabilizations (Calvo and Vegh,
1998).  In addition these periods also have a wide current account deficit.  It is interesting to
note that terms of trade were not exceptionally low during crises, so they are not purely a
result of bad external environment.
The data show that the relationship between the exchange rate regime and the
misalignment is consistent with the discussion in the previous section.  The real exchange
rate is relatively undervalued during periods of crawling peg.  Therefore, crawling pegs have
a bias toward competitiveness, while fixed exchange rate regimes have a bias toward
controlling inflation.  Crises are associated with misalignments since they present the highest
overvaluation.
Fiscal figures show that during the fixed and band exchange rate regimes, fiscal
accounts were in surplus o a slight deficit.  Therefore, except the crisis of 1962, the collapse
of the fixed regimes cannot be attributed to a fiscal problem.  Moreover, during the period
with a band, the nineties, the fiscal position has been the strongest and the level of
government expenditure the lowest.Sectoral composition of output, exports and employment do not show clear patterns
across exchange rate regimes, and are relatively stable.  Only in the latest period is there an
increase in the share of exports of manufactures, although production of manufactures
declines slightly compared to other periods.  These figures show the big change that has
taken place within industry, which, although in the sixties and seventies it was essentially
producing import substitutes, has become intensive in exports.  Similar change has taken
place in agriculture, forestry and fishing.  In all of these sectors the share of exports has
increased during the nineties, although the share of labor (and output) has declined
significantly in this same period, reflecting the change toward activities oriented to exports
and intensive in capital from traditional products produced for domestic markets.  The level
of the real exchange rate and the exchange rate regime are important in the explanation of
these changes.
Clearly, during the nineties (the period of the exchange rate band), financial
development has been the highest, measured by the relative size of M2 or credit from the
banking system.  During crises, financial development declines substantially and MI /GDP
increases.
Finally, unemployment appears to be somewhat larger during crawling peg regimes, but
this is a consequence of the recovery from the (currency) crisis of 1983-83 that resulted in
high unemployment for the next several years.  Unionization has also tended to increase
during crises, which is due,, to a large extent, to the fact that the first to become
unemployed are workers not affiliated to unions.
5. The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes: Multinomial Analysis
In this section I analyze the determinants of the exchange rate regime.  First, I present a brief
methodological description, and then the results.  The results are divided into three parts, in
the first part I present some partial correlations (univariate regressions) between the main
economic and political variables and the prevailing exchange rate regime.  In the second part
I present more general results.  And in the third part I simplify the analysis by separating the
exchange rate regime in crawling peg and rest, and hence I can use standard logit technique.
5.1 Methodology
Given that the possible choices arej=1,2,3 and 4, for the exchange rate regime, we can
estimate
the following multinomial logit model:
12
                                                       
12 For further details see Greene (1993), chapter 2l .
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(1)However, if we replace bj by bj+z in the previous expression, the term exp(z’Xi) cancels out and
hence the probability is exactly the same.  To solve this indeterminacy one needs to
normalize one of the b’s to zero.  I choose the crawling peg (i=3) to normalize since it is the
regime in most of the observations.  Although the coefficients depend on the normalization,
the marginal effects are independent of it.  Therefore, equation (1) becomes:
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The parameters of these equations are not easy to interpret, especially since the effects of a
given variable on the probability of a given regime is rather complicated.  Therefore, in order
to assess the impact of a given variable, it is possible to calculate the marginal effects of a
change in a given variable on the probability of a given regime.  The expression for the
“marginal” effect of the vector X on the probability of a given regime (the gradient) is:
where Pj is the probability of a given regime.  Those probabilities are evaluated at the mean
of the independent variables.  In the presentation of the results, to have an indicator closer to
elasticities I normalize changes around the mean by 10%.
It is important to make to clarifications before going into the results. First of all, the
sample is relatively small, with only 37 data points and not enough variability since 20
observations correspond to crawling peg, 5 to wide band, 5 to fixed exchange rate, and 6 to
crisis.  Therefore, it will be difficult to obtain strong results for experiences that have just
five or six observations.  For this reason the last part of this section looks at the choice of
crawling against the rest.  And second, the definition of crisis is also disputable since it is not
a choice, it is the only alternative.  Hence, the regression results may not only be measuring
the choice of regime, but also the likelihood of currency crises.
5.2 Results from Univariate Multinomial Logit
As a first pass on the data Tables 7 and 8 present  univariate regressions for the main
variables.
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X
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¶Each entry corresponds to the effect on the probability of choosing a given regime when the
independent variable increases ten percent around its mean.  The mean of each variable in
the sample is in the last row of each table.  Table 7 examines the contemporaneous
correlation, and Table 8 at lagged independent variables to avoid potential problems of
simultaneity.
The results for inflation are weak and small in magnitude, but they show that fixed
exchange rate regime is more likely to be chosen when past inflation is low.  There is also a
negative contemporaneous correlation between fixed exchange rate regime and inflation.  In
contrast when inflation is high, a crawling peg is the more likely choice.  The results say, for
example, that an increase in past inflation by 6.4 percentage points increases the probability
of choosing a crawling peg by 1.3% and reduces the probability of a fixed exchange rate by
1.2%. This result statistically confirms the discussion of previous sections since low inflation
may create the temptation to accelerate progress using the exchange rate as an anchor.  In
contrast, crawling pegs, by targeting the real exchange rate, may have the cost of allowing
higher inflation in order to restore competitiveness.
The results for the terms of trade are puzzling because they are contrary to what would
be expected at first.  According to the results, fixed exchange rates are less likely when
terms of trade improve.  Since fixed exchange rates cause a real appreciation and external
sustainability is their Achilles heel, one would expect that the choice of fixing may be more
likely when terms of trade are relatively good.  One possible reason for these results may be
that what matters is not the level of the terms of trade, but rather their movements.
However, the residuals from an AR(l) process for the terms of trade were also used and the
results did not change.  Nevertheless, there is another explanation that is also based on the
results of the previous section on the determinants of the real exchange rate.  A deterioration
in the terms of trade leads to an exchange rate depreciation, and hence, to offset its
inflationary effects an inflation-adverse policy maker may choose to fix the exchange rate,
rather than accommodate with more inflation.  This could be the dominant effect in the
sample.  The results also indicate that crisis also occur with bad terms of trade shocks, which
is expected.
The BMP shows a strong contemporary correlation with exchange rate regimes, but not
when lagged variables are used in the regressions.  This confirms the idea discussed before
that fixed exchange rate regimes coincide with capital account and of foreign exchange
transaction liberalization.  When unemployment is high and growth in the previous year is
low it is more likely a crawling peg regime.  In contrast, growth is higher with fixed
exchange rate regimes, consistent with the initial boom of exchange rate-based stabilizations.
The results for misalignment are basically the same for contemporaneous and lagged
variables, and similar to the results of Table 6. Undervaluation is more likely to happen with
crawling peg regimes, while the others have a tendency toward overvaluation.  This
reinforces the idea that the main objective of the crawling peg is linked to competitiveness.Regarding composition of economic activity the share of manufactures increases in
crisis.  This result, however, may be a reverse causality since the most affected sectors are
non-tradables during currency crises.  A large exports sector makes a crawling peg or a
more flexible regime such as the band more likely, while it makes fixed regimes less likely.
This is consistent with the preliminary finding that openness is linked to an exchange rate
regime, which allows a weak currency to build support for the economic strategy.
However, there could be a reverse causality problem, since a large exportable sector is the
result of a real depreciation.
The effects of financial intermediation on the choice of regime is weak and the signs are
the same as those of the share of exports.  This result, although weak, is also puzzling since
one would expect the opposite, rather than the same, signs for the size of intermediation and
the share of exports, since they would indicate relative strength of very different interest
groups.  However, as corporate conglomerates grow in importance, and they have ties with
the non-tradable sectors, and perhaps the financial sector, the dividing line among interest
groups in terms of productive sector is rather blurry.
Unionization has a relevant coefficient only in the case of fixed exchange rates and in
crises.  In the first case the results show that it was smaller under fixed exchange rate
unionization, as in the early 1960s and the early 1980s.  In turn, during crisis unionization, it
increased.  However, this was mainly influenced by the experience of the early 1970s.  As
for lagged variables, high unionization is less likely to be followed by a crisis and more likely
to be followed by a crawling peg.
5.3 Multinomial Logit Results
Multiple regressions with different coefficients across regimes are bound in the number of
regressors since some regimes have, at most, 5 observations.  For this reason, only
combinations of two variables were used in the multiple regressors case.  The more variables
were introduce the more the results for the sign and significance of the different variables
changed.
Tables 9, 10 and 11 show regressions using pairs of variables.  Coefficients of crawling
pegs are normalized to zero.  The first panel in each table shows the results, the second the
forecasting ability of the regression, and the third the impact of a change in a variable on the
probability of a given regime.
In Table 9, there are lagged values of BMP and inflation.  The results are in line with
those of the univariate correlations, except the negative sign for the variable inflation in
crises.  The forecasting ability of this regression is relatively good since it is correct in its
prediction in 28 out of the 36 years sampled, and tends to over-predict periods of crawling
peg and under-predict crises.  Table 10 replaces lagged BMP by current ratio of exports to
GDP.  The results are similar, confirming that the share of exports increases with crawling
pegs and bands, and declines in crises and under fixed exchange rates.Finally, Table 11 shows regressions with misalignment and the share of exports.  It is
important that these two variables be considered together since the competitiveness bias of
some regimes do not necessarily look for an undervaluation, but want to boost exports.
This can explain why the relative importance of the coefficients change.  Indeed, the results
show that undervaluations are associated with crawling pegs, something observed also in
univariate regressions; and overvaluations under fixed exchange rates.  For crises and bands,
the coefficient is negative, but smaller.  On the other hand, crawling pegs are associated with
a large share of exports, while the contrary occurs for fixed exchange rates.  Therefore, the
results show that crawling peg regimes are essentially oriented toward competitiveness and
export promotion, while fixed exchange rate regimes are related to misalignments and low
inflation.
5.4 Binomial Logit
A final set of results is presented in Table 12.  There are few observations for fixed exchange
rates, bands and crises, while there are 20 observations with crawling peg.  For this reason, I
analyze choosing between a crawling peg and a band or fixed exchange rate.  Management
of exchange rates in a currency crisis is not considered, since it is not really a choice.  In
addition, and as discussed before, crawling pegs have been, in general, associated to some
form of capital or exchange controls, while fixed exchange rate periods and with the band
during the nineties have been much more liberal.  Therefore, one could also interpret the
results as related to the choice of capital controls.
There are 31 observations, 20 of which crawling peg years, and the remaining I I are
band or fixed exchange rates.  The results confirm most of the findings presented above.
Crawling pegs are more likely with high inflation and high shares of exports.  They are also
more likely when terms of trade are high.  A significant number of crawling peg experiences
were in the 1960s, during the Breton Woods era.  They are more likely when the world
trend is a fixed exchange rate.  Black market premium is also higher with crawling peg
indicating the presence of capital controls.  Finally, crawling pegs have been in place more
often with low growth and high unemployment.
6. Conclusions
This paper has discussed and analyzed empirically the determinants of exchange rate regimes
in the Chilean economy since 1960.  Many indicators have been used to proxy for different
relevant factors that should influence the choice of regime.  Despite the few observations,--a
37-year period--which makes obtaining strong results difficult, there is some evidence for
the factors underlying the choice of the exchange rate regime.
Of course the results must be interpreted with caution.  First, causality is not clear.  For
example, crawling pegs are more likely when growth is low, but this is due, in part, to the
fact that crawling pegs have been used after currency crises to restore competitiveness.
Second, the empirical results are basic descriptions of the relationships among the data.  It isnot possible to derive straightforward policy implications from these results, since they are
not based on a model that connects all of the variables.
For example, the fact that fixed exchange rates are associated with a boom in economic
activity does not imply that this is a policy to get out of a recession.
The results indicate that low inflation and unification of exchange rate markets
(measured through a reduction of the black market premium) are associated with fixed
exchange rate periods.  Moreover, low inflation precedes the choice of the fixed exchange
rate regime, which suggests that such a policy is used mostly by inflation-adverse policy
makers seeking to use the exchange rate as an anchor.  Indeed, I argue that there is a
temptation to use the exchange rate to consolidate low inflation, since fixing the exchange
rate when progress has been made, but not enough to declare victory.  This is what was
observed in the late fifties and in the late eighties.
Overvaluation is also another characteristic of periods of fixed exchange rate regimes.
There is, of course, the issue of compensation and political sustainability for large changes in
relative prices.  Periods of fixed exchange rates are also associated with a strong expansion
of economic activity, and hence, this reduces the pressures stemming from interest groups
that lose, since most sectors are benefited by the boom.  The two fixed exchange rate
regimes in Chile have ended in currency crises, a period of instability, the introduction of
capital controls, and foreign exchange restrictions.
Political economy factors, as measured by the relative size of different groups, do not
appear to play a direct important role in the determination of the regime.  However, this
does not imply that political economy plays no role in the choice of exchange rate regime.  It
is likely that important entrepreneurial groups are linked to several sectors, especially in both
tradables and non tradables.
There are, however, indications that political economy factors underlie some decisions
regarding the exchange rate regime, as well as other related policies, such as trade regime
and subsidies given after currency crises.  Inflation and unemployment play a role in the
choice of regime.  During most of the period from 1960 to 1997 exchange rate policy
followed a crawling peg, with some form of capital controls.  This situation changed since
1990, when a widening exchange rate band was implemented.  This paper shows that
crawling pegs have been used, though at the cost of inflation, to depreciate the real
exchange rate.  Crawling pegs usually follow periods of high growth and low inflation.
Exchange rate policy is certainly determined jointly with another set of policies that
responds to the objectives of the authorities and the interactions among interest groups.
This is the case of the sharp undervaluation of the second half of the seventies, which was
clearly intended to compensate for the deep trade liberalization that exposed most of the
economy to external competition, something unknown given the Chilean tradition of import
substitution.  More direct compensation mechanism have been used regarding exchange ratepolicy, like subsidies to debtors in foreign exchange after the devaluation of 1982, discussed
above.Figure 1. Real exchange Rate
(Index 1986=100)
Figure 2. Black Market Premium
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BMPFigure 3. Trade Regimes
Liberalization Index and Tariffs
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eFigure 5. Annual Inflation Rate
(log scale)
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Inflation rateFigure 7. GDP Growth Rate
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1960 1 1973 2 1986 3
1961 1 1974 3 1987 3
1962 1 1975 3 1988 3
1963 2 1976 3 1989 3
1964 2 1977 3 1990 3
1965 3 1978 3 1991 3
1966 3 1979 1 1992 4
1967 3 1980 1 1993 4
1968 3 1981 1 1994 4
1969 3 1982 2 1995 4
1970 3 1983 3 1996 4
1971 2 1984 3





0 - 20 3 1 7 5 16
20 - 70 2 2 12 0 16
70 - 110 1 3 1 0 5
Average Tariffs 39.2 52.8 31.3 10.5 32.1
Standard
Deviation
31.3 34.6 16.5 0.9 23





1 - 8 2 5 6 0 13
8 - 16 1 0 6 0 7
16 - 20 3 1 8 5 17
Average ITL 13.5 5.5 13 20 12.8
Standard
Deviation
7.5 7.1 6.6 0 7.3





0% - 5% 3 0 4 5 12
5% - 10% 2 1 4 0 7
10% - 50% 0 0 9 0 9
50% - and up% 1 5 3 0 9
Average BMP 13.3 386.7 27.1 0.6 79.6
Standard
Deviation
23.4 419.3 27.1 0.5 209.1Table 5. Real Exchange Rate
(1) (2)
Chilean Productivity of Labor -1.004 -1.496
(-3.68) (-7.49)
U.S. Productivity of Labor 1.415 2.052
(3.97) (7.81)
Relative Productivity of Labor
Net Foreign Assets (log) -0.154 -0.168
(-4.84) (-5.00)
Fiscal Surplus 0.009 0.013
(1.44) (1.98)
Openness





Durbin Watson. 1.84 1.89
Observations 37 37
Note:  t-statistics in parenthesis.
     Equations (1), (2), (3) include a dummy for the period 1974-1996, for fiscal surplus and the constant.Table 6.1. Variables Statistics by Exchange Rate Regime
 Rate Regime
Inflation GDP Growth Current Account Terms of Cooper Price
(%) (%) (% of GDP) Trade Index  (cUS$/pound)
Fixed Mean 20.4 6.6 -6.7 129.8 59,4
S.d. 13.9 1.5 4.1 17.2 33,3
Crisis Mean 133.0 -0.4 -3.8 167.3 53.2
S.d. 191.4 8.2 2.8 49.6 18.1
Crawling Peg Mean 66.7 4.0 -3.3 152.8 75.8
S.d. 105.7 5.3 3.3 63.3 24.0
Band Mean 9.7 7.4 -2.3 104.6 106.4
S.d. 2.6 2.5 2.0 8.9 16.7
All the Sample Mean 62.2 4.1 -3.8 145.0 73.6




Term Real Exchange Misalignment Fiscal Surplus
Government.
Expenditure
(% of GDP) Foreign Debt
 (% of GDP)
Rate Sample 60-96
2
(%GDP) (% of GDP)
Fixed Mean 6.6 26.9 30.9 -3.7% -0.1
S.d. 6.6 10.4 16.2 13.5% 5.3
Crisis Mean 2.3 30.8 23.4 -14.3% -7.8
S.d. 4.2 13.0 10.5 12.2% 4.4
Crawling Peg Mean 6.5 51.6 49.6 7.0% -1.0
S.d. 6.0 26.2 24.5 12.5% 2.6
Band Mean 22.4 31.6 68.3 -6.3% 2.1
S.d. 2.0 3.6 4.0 3.4% 0.3
All the Sample Mean 8.0 41.5 44.8 0.0% -1.5
S.d. 8.0 22.9 23.9 14.1% 4.4
1 BMP: Observed dollar exchange rate over official rate.2 Estimation based on equation (3), Table 5.










(% of GDP) (% of GDP) Sector
 (% of GDP)
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) Telecommunications
Fixed Mean 9.1 12.3 31.5 10.0 20.7
S.d. 0.5 6.3 16.7 0.5 1.2
Crisis Mean 14.4 10.6 22.1 9.6 22.7
S.d. 6.4 9.6 29.7 1.1 3.1
Crawling Peg Mean 8.7 18.3 34.6 10.0 20.7
S.d. 0.8 13.2 26.7 0.6 2.3
Band Mean 8.8 29.6 49.9 8.9 18.5
S.d. 0.2 1.4 3.5 0.2 0.4
All the Sample Mean 9.7 17.7 34.2 9.8 20.7

















Fixed Mean 71.1 6.7 21.7 13.2 23.3
S.d. 16.4 1.6 14.6 3.6 6.9
Crisis Mean 80.4 4.7 14.3 10.8 21.5
S.d. 11.8 2.9 8.4 2.8 5.5
Crawling Peg Mean 66.8 8.1 24.7 19.8 20.3
S.d. 14.9 5.1 10.2 5.9 3.3
Band Mean 46.3 11.3 42.4 22.2 16.5
S.d. 2.2 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.2
All the Sample Mean 66.9 7.8 24.9 17.6 20.5
S.d. 16.4 4.3 12.5 6.2 4.5Table 7. Effect on Regimes - Probabilities of 10% Change (around mean) in Independent Variable
Univariate Regression and Contemporaneous Independent Variable
Inflation Terms of
Trade




Fixed -0.86% -1.84% -2.34% -0.03% -6.15% -0.71% 8.84%
Crisis 0.54% 1.90% 11.39% -1.55% -2.22% 10.14% -0.90%
Crawling Peg 0.32% 2.78% -9.05% 3.80% 5.27% -2.48% -0.92%
Band 0.00% -2.84% 0.00% -2.22% 3.10% -6.95% 0.93%
Mean of variable 62.22 144.95 1.80 9.56 0.18 0.21 4.15
(whole sample)
Table 8. Effect on Regimes - Probabilities of 10% Change (around mean)
in Independent Variable
Univariate regression and Lagged Independent Variable
Inflation Terms of
Trade







Fixed -1.22% -1.52% 0.00% 0.89% -4.38% -1.62% 0.98%
Crisis -0.08% 2.54% 0.79% -3.20% -0.61% 11.11% 0.04%
Crawling Peg 1.30% 1.98% -0.79% 48.76% 1.86% -0.38% -2.02%
Band 0.00% -3.00% 0.00% -2.56% 3.13% -9.10% 1.00%
Mean of variable
(relevant sample)
63.76 146.15 1.82 9.67 0.17 0.21 4.061The measure of misalignment employed on Table 7 and 8, was estimated with the equation  (3) on Table 5, and the estimated effect corresponds to ten points
change in the mean of misalignment.Table 9.1.  Multinomial  Logit Model
Lagged Inflation and Lagged Black Market Premium
Fixed Crisis Band
Constant 39.7 -5.42 63.8
(2.178) (-1.800) (1.598)
BMP(lagged) -38.0 4.20 -59.9
(-2.157) (1.507) (-1.520)






Chi-Squared ( 3) 43.8
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. No results reported for Crawling Peg since it is used as normalization
vector.
Table 9.2. Frequencies of Actual & Predicted Outcomes
Predicted Outcome has Maximum Probability
PREDICTED
ACTUAL Fixed Crisis Crawling Peg Band TOTAL
Fixed 2 0 1 2 5
Crisis 0 3 3 0 6
Crawling Peg 1 0 19 0 20
Band 1 0 0 4 5
Total 4 3 23 6 36
Table 9.3. Effect on Regimes - Probabilities of 10% Change (around mean)
in Independent Variable
BMP lagged Inflation Lagged
Fixed 0.00% 0.00%
Crisis 4.84% -3.06%
Crawling Peg -4.84% 3.06%
Band 0.00% 0.00%
Mean of variable 1.82 63.76(relevant Sample)
Table 10.1. Multinomial  Logit Model
Share of Exports on GDP and Lagged Inflation
Fixed Crisis Band.
Constant 4.3 8.39 1.32
(1.775) (2.289) (0.481)
Exports on GDP -26.7 -72.5 11.9
(-1.992) (-2.252) (0.839)






Chi-Squared ( 3) 34.7
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. No results reported for Crawling Peg since it is used as normalization
vector.
Table 10.2. Frequencies of Actual & Predicted Outcomes
Predicted Outcome has Maximum Probability
PREDICTED
ACTUAL Fixed Crisis Crawling Peg Band TOTAL
Fixed 2 1 2 0 5
Crisis 0 5 0 1 6
Crawling Peg 1 1 17 1 20
Band 0 0 2 3 5
Total 3 7 21 5 36








Crawling Peg 3.73% 0.97%
Band 0.00% 0.00%Mean of variable 0.18 63.76
(relevant sample)
Table 11.1. Multinomial  Logit Model
Real Exchange Rate Misalignment
1 and Share of Exports on GDP
Fixed Crisis Band.
Constant 2.81 4.35 -15.2
(1.289) (1.258) (-1.600)
RER Misalignment -6.03 -14.8 -35.6
(-0.95) (-1.85) (-1.92)






Chi-Squared ( 3) 36.5
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. No results reported for Crawling Peg since it is used as normalization
vector.
Table 11.2. Frequencies of Actual & Predicted Outcomes
Predicted Outcome has Maximum Probability
PREDICTED
ACTUAL Fixed Crisis Crawling Peg Band TOTAL
Fixed 1 2 3 0 6
Crisis 2 3 0 1 6
Crawling Peg 1 1 18 0 20
Band 0 0 2 3 5
Total 4 6 23 4 37







Crawling Peg 13.60% 6.91%Band -2.65% 0.89%
Mean of variable 0 0.18
(relevant sample)
1 Equation (3) in Table 5.
2 The estimated effect corresponds to ten points change in the mean of misalignment.Table 12. Binomial Logit Estimations: The Choice of Crawling Peg
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth -0.281 -0.281
Test t (-1.792) (-1.773)
10% Effect -2.5% -2.5%




Test t (1.554) (1.864)








Exports Share on GDP
2 55.06 65.945
Test t (2.064) (1.837)
10% Effect 1.1% 11.2%
Bmp 12.67 20.187
Test t (2.289) (2.169)












Test t (2.233) (2.272)
10 points Effect 31% 24%
Log-Likelihood -8.9 -9.1 -13.4 -7.5 -13.7
Restricted ( Coef=0) -20.2 -20.2 -20.2 -19.1 -20.2
Chi-Squared 22.6 22.1 13.6 23.1 12.9
Predicted/ Observations 29/31 28/31 25/31 26/31 26/31
    1Sampled for the period 1974-1996.
    2 In equation (1), this variable was sampled for the period 1974-1996.
    3 In equation (3), this variable was sampled for the period 1974-1996.References
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